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Abstract 
Charities in the UK have been the subject of intense media, political and public scrutiny in 
recent times; however our understanding of the nature, extent and determinants of charity 
misconduct is weak. Drawing upon a novel administrative dataset of 25,611 charities for the 
period 2006-2014 in Scotland, we develop models to predict two dimensions of charity 
misconduct: regulatory investigation and subsequent action. There have been 2,109 
regulatory investigations of 1,566 Scottish charities over the study period, of which 31 
percent resulted in regulatory action being taken. Complaints from members of the public are 
most likely to trigger an investigation, while the most common concerns relate to general 
governance and misappropriation of assets. Our multivariate analysis reveals a disconnect 
between the types of charities that are suspected of misconduct and those that are subject to 
subsequent regulatory action. 
Keywords: charity misconduct, nonprofit regulation, charity accountability, nonprofit risk, 
nonprofit failure, nonprofit governance 
  
Introduction 
Charities in the UK have been the subject of intense media, political and public scrutiny in 
recent times (Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2016; Office of 
the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2016). Public confidence and trust in the sector has been 
questioned in light of various “scandals” including unethical fundraising practices (resulting 
in the establishment of a new fundraising regulator for England and Wales in 2016), high 
levels of chief executive pay, politically-motivated lobbying and advocacy work, and poor 
financial management. This last issue has gained traction among politicians and the media as 
a result of the demise of Kids Company, a prominent London-based charity that provided 
practical, emotional and educational support to vulnerable children. It ceased operations in 
August 2015 amidst accusations of, amongst other concerns, inadequate and improper 
financial conduct. Fraud in the UK charity sector is estimated to cost around £1.9 billion per 
year, with payroll and procurement fraud accounting for the vast majority of this figure (PKF 
Littlejohn, 2016). It was two cases of charity financial misconduct – at Moonbeams and 
Breast Cancer Research – that acted as the germinator for the establishment of a dedicated 
Scottish charity regulator (Lambert, 2010). Prior to OSCR, the Scottish charitable sector was 
very lightly regulated by the UK Inland Revenue, and there was significant support from the 
sector itself for clearer statutory regulation (Dunn, 2016). Cases and concerns such as these 
call into question the adequacy of charity monitoring and regulation, and their role in 
protecting and enhancing public confidence in the sector (Cordery, 2013; Krashinsky, 2003). 
To date there has been little academic research on the nature, extent and determinants of 
regulatory investigations into alleged and actual charity misconduct; this is partly due to the 
difficulties in accessing and processing the administrative data necessary to study this 
outcome, as well as the relative infancy of charity regulatory regimes. Examining this topic 
allows researchers to “peer under the hood” of the sector, shining a light on aspects of charity 
  
behaviour that are often overlooked. Research in this area has the potential to improve the 
evidence base on charity misconduct and accountability, improve regulatory practice through 
the targeting of resources at serious incidences of misbehaviour, and dispel misperceptions 
around the conduct of these organizations (by providing context for media reports for 
example). This paper represents the first systematic, UK study of charity misconduct. Though 
there is considerable variation in the level and type of monitoring, charity regulators 
internationally would benefit from a clearer understanding of the risks inherent in their 
sectors and the degree of action necessary to mitigate these issues. Using novel data supplied 
by the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR), our research describes the nature and 
extent of alleged and actual misconduct by Scottish charities, and asks what organizational 
and financial factors are associated with this outcome? We show that the factors which 
predict complaints about charities are not necessarily good predictors of the need for 
regulatory action. Our results support the move of charity regulators to a ‘risk-led’ approach 
to regulation where a wide range of factors inform decisions about where limited resources 
should be focussed in regulating the sector. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we describe charity regulation in Scotland, and in 
particular the misconduct monitoring programme. This is followed by a review of the 
literatures on charity failure and fraud from where we derive suitable explanatory variables. 
We outline the data and methods, before presenting our empirical results. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the study. 
Investigating Charity Misconduct 
The Scottish Charity Register is maintained by the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator 
(OSCR) which was established in 2003 as an Executive Agency and took up its full powers 
when the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 came into force in April 
  
2006. In Scotland, a charity is defined (under statute) as an organization that is listed on the 
Register after demonstrating that it passes the charity test: it must have only charitable 
purposes; the organization must or intend to provide some form of public benefit; it must not 
allow its assets to be used for non-charitable purposes; it cannot be governed or directed by 
government ministers; and it cannot be a political party (Office of the Scottish Charity 
Regulator, n.d).1 One of OSCR’s main responsibilities is to identify and investigate apparent 
misconduct and protect charity assets. It operationalises this duty by opening an investigation 
(what they term an inquiry) into the actions of a charity suspected of misconduct and other 
misdemeanours.  
Investigations are mainly initiated as a result of a public complaint but they can also be 
opened by a referral from a department in OSCR or another regulator. For example, one of 
the founders of the charity The Kiltwalk reported the organization to OSCR on the grounds 
that he has concerns over the amount of funds raised by the organization that are spent on 
meeting the needs of beneficiaries (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2015). OSCR 
can only deal with concerns that relate to charity law – such as damage to charitable assets or 
beneficiaries, misconduct or misrepresentation – though it can refer cases to other bodies 
such as when criminal activity is suspected. Upon receipt of a concern, the regulator will 
consider the following: whether it has a legal power to act; whether there is a risk to 
charitable assets, to beneficiaries, to the abuse of charitable status, and to the charity sector as 
a whole; whether the concern should be dealt with by another regulator or body; and the 
anticipated level of action required. Finally, the outcome is recorded for each investigation. 
Outcomes are varied and often specific to each investigation but most can be related to three 
common categories: no action taken or necessary; advice given; and regulatory intervention. 
Literature 
  
The study of misconduct is part of the broader field of nonprofit failure and success. Mellahi 
and Wilkinson (2004) identify two leading schools of thought in the study of organizational 
success and failure: deterministic and voluntaristic. Population ecology theory is 
deterministic and focuses on organizational density, size and age as affecting the life chances 
of organizations, as well as a suite of environmental factors (such as regulation and the state 
of the economy). All of these factors are considered outside the control of the organization. In 
contrast, the voluntaristic perspective sees “good strategic choices as the keys to 
organizational success. Particular emphasis is placed on organizational structure, the role and 
composition of the board, and how problems are perceived and solved.” (Mellahi & 
Wilkinson, 2004, p. 268)  
The study of charity misconduct has tended to focus on instances of occupational fraud, of 
which there are two major types: fraud conducted against the organization (e.g. 
misappropriation of cash by an employee) and fraud conducted by the organization such as 
the deliberate misreporting of financial performance (Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon & Keating, 
2007). Previous research has focused on the nature of fraud in the US nonprofit sector, the 
organizations subject to fraud, and perpetrators of said action (Archambeault, Webber & 
Greenlee, 2015). Bradley (2014) conjectures that occupational fraud damages the 
organization subjected to it (through significant financial loss, reduced income from 
donations and potential fines), intended beneficiaries (through the diversion of funds away 
from services), and the reputation of the nonprofits (loss of public confidence). It is posited 
that the nonprofit sector is particularly sensitive to the negative effects of fraud, especially 
asset misappropriation, as these organizations often lack sufficient controls for detecting and 
dealing with this issue (Archambeault et al., 2015). Douglas and Mills (2000) proposed five 
reasons why this might be the case: an atmosphere of trust surrounding the nonprofit; the 
difficulty in controlling certain revenue streams (for example, cash donations); a lack of 
  
financial resources necessary to implement sufficient internal controls; a lack of business 
expertise in the organization; and the reliance on volunteer boards. Marks and Ugo (2012) 
corroborate these assertions and also theorise that the type of nonprofit is a relevant factor: 
for example, they argue that grant-making organizations might be more susceptible to 
financial fraud than commercial nonprofits due to the higher risk of misappropriation. 
Empirical research by Greenlee et al. (2007) and Holtfreter (2008) tentatively substantiated 
the conjectures of Douglas and Mills, finding some evidence of financial misconduct in the 
US nonprofit sector. Krishnan, Yetman and Yetman (2006) examined the financial statements 
of US nonprofits and discovered that some of these organizations (38 of 101) reported an 
average of $7 million less fundraising on their annual return than on their audited financial 
statements. 
However there are some significant limitations to previous studies. Research on nonprofit 
success and failure has mainly focused on the most economically important subsectors: in a 
review of the literature, Helmig et al. (2014) found that the first four ICNPO groups (Health, 
Culture and Recreation, Social Services, and Education and Research) accounted for the 
majority of studies in this field (102 of 147 reviewed articles).2 With respect to misconduct, 
the scope of the topic has been narrowly defined, with an understandable yet limited focus on 
occupational fraud and its relation to financial losses. Many of these previous studies have 
been hampered by small sample sizes, necessitating exploratory work over descriptive and 
explanatory analyses (Archambeault et al., 2015). Consequently, much of this exploratory 
work has focused on nonprofit subsectors such as Human and Health Services (e.g. Gibelman 
& Gelman, 2001). Researchers have also struggled to acquire suitable data, with many studies 
relying on unrepresentative self-completion surveys conducted by third parties or analyses of 
print media reports of nonprofit fraud (see Fremont-Smith & Kosaras, 2003; Gibelman & 
  
Gelman, 2001; Greenlee et al., 2007). Finally, extant research is US centric, with little 
academic focus on other geographies or charity sectors (Clifford & Mohan, 2016).  
The availability of comprehensive regulatory data in other jurisdictions, such as Scotland, 
allows researchers to address important questions that are not currently possible with US 
data. Contributing to the literature on charity misconduct we address three research questions: 
1. What is the nature and extent of regulatory investigations in the Scottish charity 
sector? 
2. What are the risk factors associated with being investigated? 
3. Having been investigated, what factors account for variation in regulatory action 
being taken? 
In answering these questions, we derive measures from studies of nonprofit success and 
failure that employed a population ecology perspective. The liability of newness hypothesis 
posits that recently founded organizations “are inexperienced, lack the resources to ensure 
resilience in times of crisis, and have not yet mustered sufficient external support.” 
(Wollebaek, 2009, p. 269). Also, smaller charities are hypothesised as being more likely to 
fail, possibly due to difficulties in sourcing funding, volunteers and staff (Barron, West & 
Hannan, 1994; Bielefeld, 1994). The next section describes the operationalisation of our 
variables in more detail. 
Method 
This study examines two dimensions of charity misconduct that deserve greater attention: 
regulatory investigation and subsequent action. Regulatory action can take the following two, 
broad forms: the provision of advice (e.g. recommending a charity improve its financial 
controls to counteract the threat of fraud or misappropriation) and the use of OSCR’s formal 
  
regulatory powers (e.g. reporting the charity to prosecutors or suspending trustees). This 
study overcomes many of the limitations outlined previously by utilising a novel 
administrative dataset, derived from OSCR, covering the complete population (current and 
historical) of registered Scottish charities. It is constructed from three sources: the Scottish 
Charity Register, which is the official, public record of all charities that have operated in 
Scotland; annual returns, which are used to populate many of the fields on the Register (e.g. 
annual gross income); and internal OSCR departmental data relating to misconduct 
investigations. Once linked using each observation’s Scottish Charity Number, this dataset 
contains 25,611 observations over the period 2006-2014. Table 1 summarises the steps in the 
sample selection process. 
[Table 1 here] 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
The outcome of being investigated by the regulator is measured using a dichotomous variable 
that has the value 1 if a charity has been investigated and 0 if not. The other two dependent 
variables are also dichotomous: regulatory action takes the value 1 if a charity has had 
regulatory action taken against it and 0 if not; and intervention takes the value 1 if a charity is 
subject to regulatory intervention and 0 if not (i.e. it received advice instead). The dependent 
variables are modelled using binary logistic regression. Drawing on the reviewed literature, 
five independent and three control variables are operationalised in this study. For two, the 
literature suggests clear hypotheses for their effects. Size is a categorical measure of a 
charity’s most recent annual gross income; the literature supports a hypothesis that increasing 
size decreases the risk of failure. Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years an 
organization has existed; in line with previous studies we posit a negative relationship 
between age and risk.  In contrast, for three of our independent variables the literature does 
  
not predict a clear direction of effect. Grant is a binary indicator of whether a charity only 
disburses grants to other organizations rather than carrying out charitable activities itself or a 
combination of functions; we hypothesise that grant-making organisations differ in their 
activities and behaviour compared to other charities, and thus their risk exposure is distinct. 
Parent is a binary indicator of whether a charity has a parent organization (e.g. parish 
churches that are part of the Church of Scotland); greater oversight may reduce risk or it may 
increase the chance of reporting misconduct to the regulator.  Complaint is a categorical 
variable that captures the actor that raised a concern with OSCR; we assume that some 
stakeholders will be better placed to identify misconduct than others.34 The three control 
variables are: Field is a nominal categorical measure of a charity’s ICNPO category (see 
Mohan & Barnard, 2013 for how these categories were assigned); Geography is a nominal 
categorical measure of a charity’s geographical scope of operations; and Form is a nominal 
categorical measure of an organization’s constitutional form (e.g. limited company). Though 
these variables measure core characteristics of charities, the literature does not suggest a 
theoretical or empirical basis for the direction of association with the outcomes. 
Results 
The sample contains demographic, financial and investigations data on 25,611 charities. Of 
these 20,053 are listed as Active on the Scottish Charity Register, with 4,246 having been 
removed and the remainder either not subject to further monitoring by OSCR or are non-
submitting charities (i.e. they have failed to submit their annual return on time or at all). The 
vast majority of organizations are defined as Standard charities (96 percent) – the remainder 
are Cross Border charities or Registered Social Landlords. The mean and median charity has 
£856,803 and £12,251 in annual gross income respectively; the mean and median age in the 
sample is 24 years and 16 years. The three most common constitutional forms for Scottish 
charities are unincorporated associations (55 percent), companies (20 percent) and trusts (18 
  
percent). Eighteen percent of charities have a parent organization while 33 percent disburse 
grants to individuals and organizations. Finally, there is a wide distribution of ICNPO 
classifications in the sector though there are more populous categories such as Social services 
(31 percent), Religion (16 percent), Culture and recreation (15 percent), and Development 
and housing (11 percent). 
Describing Investigations and Regulatory Action 
There have been 2,109 regulatory investigations of 1,566 Scottish charities over the study 
period: this represents six percent of the total number of organizations active during this 
period. The number of investigations increased steadily during OSCR’s early years and then 
plateaued at around 400 per year until 2013/14, when the figure has declined slightly. The 
majority of investigations (78 percent) concerned charities that were only investigated once in 
their history. A little over 30 percent of investigations resulted in regulatory action being 
taken against a charity: 16 percent received advice and 13 percent experienced intervention 
by OSCR.  There is no association between the number of times a charity has been 
investigated and whether regulatory action has been taken against it (Cramér’s V=.08, 
p<.001): even in cases where an organization has been investigated five, six or seven times, 
regulatory action is uncommon. This peculiarity is perhaps accounted for both by the small 
number of charities that are investigated multiple times and the spurious or unfounded nature 
of the complaints made against these organizations.  
For the 1,400 observations for which there are data, it is a member of the public that is most 
likely to contact OSCR with a concern about a charity (Table 2). Internal stakeholders of the 
charity account for 31 percent of all investigation initiators, though this disregards the strong 
possibility that many of those recorded as anonymous are involved in the running of the 
charity they have a concern about. 
  
[Table 2 here] 
The concerns that prompt these actors to raise a complaint with OSCR are numerous and 
diverse. Figure 1 below visualizes the associations between the most common types of 
complaint and the response of the regulator. The overriding concern is general governance, as 
well as associated issues such as the duties of trustees and adherence to the founding 
document. Financial misconduct also ranks highly, particularly the misappropriation of funds 
and suspicion of financial irregularity. There is a moderate association between the actor 
making the complaint and the underlying concerns (Cramer’s V=.227, p<.001). Compared to 
average, trustees were less likely to report concerns about general governance, external 
disputes and the misappropriation of funds for example. We can see that most complaints do 
not result in any action, but General Governance, Trustee Duties, Section 23 non-compliance 
and Embezzlement are most likely to lead to regulatory intervention. Concerns regarding the 
mis-appropriation of funds and accounting irregularities are most likely to result in the 
provision of advice by the regulator. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Modelling the Risk of Investigation and Action 
Before discussing the results of the multivariate analysis, Tables A1, A2 and A3 in the 
appendices contain descriptive statistics for the independent variables included in the 
statistical models. The typical investigated charity appears to be slightly younger, less likely 
to discharge grants and have a parent organization, bigger, more likely to be a company and 
considerably less likely to just operate at a local level. The typical charity subject to 
regulatory action appears to be slightly smaller and younger, less likely to have been subject 
to a complaint by a member of the public and more likely to just operate at a local level. In 
contrast to those that received advice, the typical charity that experienced intervention 
  
appears to be slightly older and smaller, more likely to have been subject to a complaint by an 
auditor, regulator or funder, and less likely by an internal charity stakeholder.5 
We model the probability of investigation using binary logistic regression as a function of 
organization size, age, institutional form, field of operations and geographical base.  For the 
sub-sample of organizations that were investigated, we then model the probability of 
regulatory action, and its different forms, being taken based on the same characteristics plus 
the source of the complaint made.6 In Table 3, we report the odds ratios (exponentiated 
coefficients) rather than the log odds as they approximate the relative risk of each outcome 
occurring. This is appropriate not only for ease of interpretation but because the absolute 
chance of either outcome occurring is low (i.e. it is better to know which charities are more 
likely relative to their peers). The category with the most observations is chosen as the base 
category for each nominal independent variable.  
[Table 3 here] 
We first examine the effects of organization age and size on the outcomes. The coefficient for 
age varies across the three outcomes. A one-unit increase in the log of age results in a five 
percent decrease in the odds of being investigated or being subject to regulatory action; 
however, the odds of experiencing intervention compared to receiving advice are higher for 
older charities. There appears to be a clear income gradient present in the investigation 
model: as organization size increases so do the odds of being investigated compared to the 
reference category. A more nuanced examination of the effect of organization size is possible 
by comparing categories of this variable to each other and not just the base category (shown 
in Figure 2). Drawing on suggestions by Firth (2003), Firth and Menezes (2004), and Gayle 
and Lambert (2007), we employ quasi-variance statistics to ascertain whether categories of 
organization size were significantly different from each other. Unsurprisingly, the largest 
  
charities have significantly higher odds than all other categories; however it appears that the 
middle categories (charities with income between £100,000 and £1m) are not significantly 
different from each other and neither are organizations between £500,000 and £10m.  
While size is the strongest predictor of complaints, the effect of size on the likelihood of 
regulatory action occurring is reversed: complaints about larger charities are less likely to 
lead to any sort of regulatory action. For being subject to regulatory intervention the income 
gradient is less apparent, though there is some evidence that larger charities have higher odds 
than the smallest category. 
[Figure 2 here] 
The odds of experiencing each outcome are lower for charities that discharge grants (with the 
exception of intervention) or have a parent organization. With regards to the actor that 
initiates an investigation, it appears that stakeholders with a monitoring role (e.g. funders, 
auditors or other regulators) are more likely than members of the public to report concerns 
that warrant some form of regulatory action; in contrast, internal charity stakeholders such as 
employees and volunteers have higher odds of identifying concerns that merit the provision 
of advice by OSCR and lower odds of triggering regulatory intervention in their charity.  
While size predicts complaints, it is the source of the complaint that is a more reliable 
predictor of the need for regulators to take action. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
With regards to being investigated, we run separate regressions for charities registered in 
different eras (pre-and-post 2006) in order to control for the period at risk: that is, there may 
be an initial period where charities are not likely to be investigated as they have just been 
registered and not very identifiable or visible. The direction of the effect of our two main 
independent variables – age and size – is similar to the main regression: for both cohorts, 
  
younger, larger charities have statistically significantly higher odds of being investigated. We 
also explore the effect of different functional forms of organization size, leaving the other 
variables unchanged: a one-unit increase in the log of annual gross income results in a 
significant increase in the odds of being investigated and a decrease in the odds of being 
subject to regulatory action. Finally, an interaction term between size and age was included in 
the model-building process. The correlation between age and being investigated is stronger 
for larger charities, though the interaction overall was not statistically significant and thus 
was not included in the final models.  
Discussion 
This study has investigated the nature, extent, and risk factors of organizational misconduct 
in the Scottish charity sector. In an era of enhanced scrutiny of their activities and impact, we 
argue it is more important than ever to understand which charities trigger complaints about 
their conduct, the concerns and organizations that merit regulatory action and what form this 
takes. This research contributes to the nascent charity misconduct literature, and the wider 
study of accountability in the sector, in a number of important ways. First, by describing the 
nature and extent of perceived and actual misconduct, we provide the first systematic, 
comprehensive description of this phenomenon, producing an evidence base of use to the 
field, policy makers and practitioners. The distribution of risk and regulatory responses 
constitutes an informative account of misconduct in the charity sector, one that complements 
analyses based on alternative sources of data (e.g. Archambeault et al., 2015; Gibelman & 
Gelman, 2001). Second, we highlight factors associated with charity investigation and 
misconduct, showing the mismatch between those predicting complaints and those predicting 
regulatory action. This has considerable implications for charity regulators seeking to deploy 
their limited resources effectively and in a way that ultimately protects and enhances public 
confidence. As Fremont-Smith (2004) notes in her comprehensive account of charity 
  
governance, charity regulators (particularly in the US) often lack the funds to carry out their 
enforcement activities properly, and thus would benefit from analyses that help them target 
their resources more efficiently.  
There is an element of predictability to the types of charities that are suspected of 
misconduct. The most prominent and consistent risk factor is the size of the organization: as 
size increases the likelihood of being investigated increases sharply, even when controlling 
for other organizational characteristics. The largest charities are significantly more likely to 
be investigated compared to all other sizes.  However it is not yet clear that size is a causal or 
explanatory factor in being investigated; it more plausibly acts as a proxy for the “true” 
explanatory factor. This is supported by the disparity in the effect of organization size 
between the likelihood of being investigated and the likelihood of that investigation leading 
to regulatory action. Size is strongly predictive of complaints, but that those complaints are 
no more likely to lead to regulatory action in large charities than small ones. The source of 
the complaint is a much stronger predictor of direct regulatory intervention than the 
organizational characteristics which predict the original complaint.  The triggering of an 
investigation could be perhaps best understood as a function of two other concepts: visibility 
and high stakes. Larger charities are more likely on average to deliver services to a greater 
number of beneficiaries, operate across a greater number of geographies, interact with the 
public on a greater scale (e.g. through fundraising campaigns) and involve more staff and 
volunteers than smaller organizations (de Andrés-Alonso, Garcia-Rodriguez & Romero-
Merino, 2015; Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). As a result they can be highly visible to many of 
the actors that initiate investigations. The degree to which actors perceive there is great deal 
at stake, in terms of the risk to charitable assets and beneficiaries, may also prompt 
complaints. Larger charities are often responsible for more valuable assets and services 
compared to their smaller counterparts and this may spur an actor to report a complaint, with 
  
little regard to the substance of the concern. It is more difficult to theorise about the 
explanatory factors of actual misconduct occurring, mainly due to the absence of appropriate 
measures in the data. However two plausible dimensions to the phenomenon on the 
organizational side are opportunity and controls. The degree to which charities feel that there 
is an opportunity to conduct itself in a way that is not compliant with public expectations and 
regulatory requirements may be a powerful predictor of misconduct. Finally, the strength of 
governance and financial controls may reveal which charities are hosts for employee, and by 
extension, organizational misconduct. These dimensions have received some attention in the 
nonprofit occupational fraud literature (e.g. Rothschild, 2013). 
There are a number of limitations to this research that must be acknowledged. Organization 
size and age traditionally function as control variables in many studies and are good examples 
of the kinds of measures inherent in administrative data. These datasets tend to contain 
coarser or proxy measures of social science concepts compared to the richness of social 
surveys (Wallgren & Wallgren, 2007) and as such there are characteristics which may be 
important in measuring risk that are not captured in the administrative data. Finally, the 
investigations data utilised in this study should not be considered as a complete record of 
dissatisfaction and misconduct in the sector. Many actors may be unwilling to raise their 
concerns with the regulator: for example, they may be unaware of to whom the complaint 
should be directed to or fearful of repercussions should they lodge their complaint (see Hogg, 
2016). Rothschild’s (2013) study of misconduct reporting in the charity sector posits that 
whistle-blowers observe misconduct several times before reporting this behaviour; the same 
study also found that whistle-blowers were subject to retaliation by the organization in a 
majority of cases. On the organizational side, some charities may be particularly adept at 
masking their misconduct from those able and willing to raise concerns. Therefore the 
  
findings of this study should be considered in the context of other data sources covering this 
topic such as media investigations and parliamentary inquiries. 
Despite these limitations, the results of this analysis have considerable practical applications 
for stakeholders in the sector, particularly regulators and those with a monitoring function. 
Our findings support a risk-led approach to regulation, where a range of factors are used to 
make decisions about targeting regulatory action. OSCR aims to discharge its regulatory 
function in a progressive, proportionate and preventative manner, and the efficient and 
effective targeting of its resources is critical in achieving this. Utilising the predicted 
probabilities generated by the models to assign risk categories to charities and investigations 
could guide the allocation of scarce resources and achieve Cordery, Sim and van Zijl’s (2015) 
call for a differentiated approach to charity regulation. Implementing such an approach 
requires regulators to be cognizant of the disconnect between complaints and misconduct. 
Our analysis shows that regulators face significant challenges in separating the “signal” 
(complaints about charities engaged in serious misconduct) from the “noise” (complaints 
outside the remit of the regulator, or not leading to regulatory action). Discontent at all levels 
can have an impact on trust in the sector, and so the answer is not simply to try to reduce 
complaints.  Rather, better guidance for charities on handling complaints within their own 
governance structures could reduce the number of unresolved issues that make it to the 
regulator. Just as important is increasing the “signal”; making sure that stakeholders with 
serious concerns about misconduct are able and willing to make complaints to the regulator. 
To this end, our analysis highlights the importance of good relations between regulators and 
stakeholders such as funders or auditors who tend to make complaints that do require 
regulatory action. 
Conclusion 
  
Reflecting on the discussion above, there are a number of fruitful avenues for research in this 
area. Regulatory data relating to investigations is generated on a continuous basis, providing 
the foundation for longitudinal analysis of complaints and misconduct; this type of data 
would be amenable to studying the duration to the first investigation and between subsequent 
occurrences for example. Further work could be done to understand the antecedents and 
outcomes resulting from investigations, particularly from the perspective of the charities and 
the actors that raise concerns. For example, Rothschild’s (2013) findings suggest that the 
frequency of observed misconduct, the democratic tendencies of management, and the 
alignment of values between the organization and whistle-blower should all be considered 
when seeking to understand the drivers of complaints about charity conduct. Though not 
incorporated into this study, it could be possible to access detailed, qualitative data on the 
content of the advice provided by OSCR and any response to this contact by the charity. With 
regards to the posited explanatory factors (visibility and high stakes), additional data could be 
sought in order to test their effect; for example, annual UK charity brand surveys are 
available for purchase and OSCR possess detailed financial information for a subset of larger 
charities in Scotland. Finally, the dependent variables in this study could be utilised as 
explanatory factors in a wider study of charity accountability internationally. By combining 
investigations data with concerns raised by charities themselves (collected by OSCR since 
April 2016) and matters of material significance reported by independent examiners and 
auditors, there is the potential to conduct a multidimensional examination of misconduct and 
accountability in the sector. 
By revealing the disconnect between the level of complaints and concerns that require 
regulatory action, we argue there is much work to do for practitioners in the sector with 
regards to charity reputation and stakeholder communication. Charity boards are ultimately 
responsible for the governance of their organization, and must ensure that adequate policies 
  
and procedures are in place. This includes reducing the risk of misconduct occurring, taking 
corrective action in response to guidance from the regulator, and developing the management 
and reporting functions required to deal with the consequences. Regulators and charity sector 
infrastructure bodies should consider developing guidance for charities of all sizes on how to 
cultivate and manage their reputations and communications with stakeholders. Recognition 
should also be given to the role that stakeholders such as funders and auditors must play in 
self-regulation of the sector, given their proximity to charities through their day-to-day 
activities. It is no longer sufficient (if indeed it ever was) to rely on charity status to convey 
trust and inspire confidence in the conduct of an organization. 
  
  
Appendices 
[Table A1 here] 
[Table A2 here] 
[Table A3 here] 
  
  
Notes 
1. When determining what constitutes public benefit, OSCR must consider: the extent of 
private benefit and its ratio to public benefit; whether there is any disbenefit to the public; and 
whether there are any undue restrictions to accessing the public benefit provided by the 
charity (e.g. unreasonable service fees). 
2. The International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations was developed as part of the 
Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project in the 1990s. It provides a means of 
categorising nonprofits according to their “economic activity” i.e. the types of goods and 
services they provide. 
3. For investigated charities, annual gross income refers to the year the investigation was 
opened; however this only applies to 1,172 observations due to issues with the recording of 
the date of the investigation. For the remaining investigated charities, annual gross income 
refers to the organization’s size as recorded in its most recent financial year. Alternative 
measures of size, such as the natural log of net assets, have been utilised in other research 
streams (most notably in financial vulnerability research) but annual gross income is chosen 
here as this information is available for all charities in the sample. This is due to there being 
detailed financial information for only a subset of charities (i.e. those with annual gross 
income greater than or equal to £250,000). This fact also accounts for the inclusion of only 
one financial independent variable in the models. 
4. Dummy variables for the ten most common types of complaint were included in early 
versions of the regression models but were excluded from the final models due to being 
highly collinear.  
  
5. The presence of multicollinearity among the independent variables was examined for each 
model by calculating the variance inflation factors (VIF). For both models, the VIF for each 
independent variable is less than 1.5 and the mean VIF is less than 1.2, below the thresholds 
at which Allison (1999) suggests multicollinearity is problematic. 
6. A bivariate probit approach that utilised the whole sample was tested to see whether the 
dependent variables should be predicted using a single model: the correlation coefficient of 
the error terms of the two outcomes was statistically insignificant, indicating that they should 
be modelled independently (i.e. by reducing the sample). 
  
  
References 
Allison, P. D. (1999). Multiple Regression: A Primer. London: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Archambeault, D. S., Webber, S., & Greenlee, J. (2015). Fraud and Corruption in U.S. 
Nonprofit Entities: A Summary of Press Reports 2008–2011. Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, 44(6), 1194–1224. 
Barron, D. N., West, E., & Hannan, M. T. (1994). A time to grow and a time to die: Growth 
and mortality of credit unions in New York City, 1914–1990. American Journal of 
Sociology, 100(2), 381–421 
Bielefeld, W. (1994). What affects nonprofit survival?. Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership, 5(1), 19–36.Callen, J. L., Klein, A., & Tinkelman, D. (2010). The 
contextual impact of nonprofit board composition and structure on organizational 
performance: Agency and resource dependence perspectives. Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 21(1), 101–125. 
Clifford, D., & Mohan, J. (2016). The Sources of Income of English and Welsh Charities: An 
Organisation-Level Perspective. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and 
Nonprofit Organizations, 27(1), 487–508. 
Cordery, C. J. (2013). Regulating Small and Medium Charities: Does It Improve 
Transparency and Accountability? Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and 
Nonprofit Organizations, 24(3), 831–851. 
Cordery, C. J., Sim, D., & van Zijl, T. (2015). Differentiated regulation: the case of charities. 
Accounting & Finance, Advance online publication.  
  
de Andrés-Alonso, P., Garcia-Rodriguez, I., & Romero-Merino, M. E. (2015). The Dangers 
of Assessing the Financial Vulnerability of Nonprofits Using Traditional Measures: 
The Case of the Nongovernmental Development Organizations in the United 
Kingdom. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 25(4), 371–382. 
Douglas, S., & Mills, K. (2000). Nonprofit fraud: What are the key indicators? Retrieved 
from 
https://charityvillage.com/Content.aspx?topic=nonprofit_fraud_what_are_the_key_ind
icators_. 
Dunn, A. (2016). Eddies and Tides Statutory Regulation, Co-regulation, and Self-Regulation 
in Charity Law in Britain. In O. B. Breen, A. Dunn, & M. Sidel (Eds). Regulatory 
Waves: Comparative Perspectives on State Regulation and Self-Regulation Policies in 
the Nonprofit Sector (pp. 21–44). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Firth, D. (2003). Overcoming the Reference Category Problem in the Presentation of 
Statistical Models. Sociological Methodology, 33(1), 1–18. 
Firth, D., & Menezes, R. (2004). Quasi-variances. Biometrika, 91(1), 65–80. 
Freeman, J., Caroll, G. R., & Hannan, M. T. (1983). The liability of newness-age dependence 
in organizational death rates. American Sociological Review, 48(5), 1–20. 
Fremont-Smith, M. R., & Kosaras, A. (2003). Wrongdoing by officers and directors of 
charities: A survey of press reports 1995–2002. Exempt Organization Tax Review, 
42(1), 25–59. 
Fremont-Smith, M. R. (2004). Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law 
and Regulation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
  
Gayle, V., & Lambert, P. (2007). Using Quasi-Variance To Communicate Sociological 
Results From Statistical Models. Sociology, 41(6), 1191–1208. 
Gibelman, M., & Gelman, S. R. (2001). Very Public Scandals: Nongovernmental 
Organizations in Trouble. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations, 12(1), 49–66. 
Greenlee, J. S., & Trussel, J. M. (2000). Predicting the Financial Vulnerability of Charitable 
Organizations. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 11(2), 199–210. 
Greenlee, J., Fischer, M., Gordon, T., & Keating, E. (2007). An Investigation of Fraud in 
Nonprofit Organizations: Occurrences and Deterrents. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 36(4), 676–694. 
Hager, M. A., Galaskiewicz, J., Bielefeld, W., & Pins, J. J. (1996). Tales from the grave: 
Organizations’ accounts of their own demise. American Behavioral Scientist, 39(8), 
975–994. 
Hannan, M. T. (1998). Rethinking Age Dependence in Organizational Mortality: Logical 
Formalizations. American Journal of Sociology, 104(1), 126–164. 
Hansmann, H. (2003). The Role of Trust in Nonprofit Enterprise. In H. K. Anheier & A. Ben-
Ner (Eds). The Study of Nonprofit Enterprise: Theories and Approaches (pp. 115–
122). New York: Springer. 
Harrison, T. D., & Laincz, C. A. (2008). Entry and exit in the nonprofit sector. Journal of 
Economic Analysis and Policy: Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 8(1), 
1–41. 
  
Helmig, B., Ingerfurth, S., & Pinz, A. (2014). Success and Failure of Nonprofit 
Organizations: Theoretical Foundations, Empirical Evidence, and Future Research. 
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 25(6), 
1509–1538. 
Hogg, E. (2016). What regulation, Who Pays? Public Opinion and Charity Regulation 
(Research Report). London : Charity Finance Group. 
Holtfreter, K. (2008). Determinants of Fraud Losses in Nonprofit Organizations. Nonprofit 
Management & Leadership, 19(1), 45–63. 
Hyndman, N., & McDonnell, P. (2009). Governance and Charities: An Exploration of Key 
Themes and the Development of a Research Agenda. Financial Accountability & 
Management, 25(1), 5–31. 
Hyndman, N., & McMahon, D. (2011). The Hand of Government in Shaping Accounting and 
Reporting in the UK Charity Sector. Public Money and Management, 31(3), 167–174. 
Krashinsky, M. (2003). Stakeholder Theories of the Nonprofit Sector: One Cut at the 
Economic Literature. In H. K. Anheier & A. Ben-Ner (Eds). The Study of Nonprofit 
Enterprise: Theories and Approaches (pp. 125–136). New York: Springer. 
Krishnan, K., Yetman, M. H., & Yetman, R. J. (2006). Expense misreporting in nonprofit 
organizations. The Accounting Review, 81(2), 399–420. 
Lambert, V. (2010). An Investigation of Governance in Scottish Charities (Unpublished 
doctoral thesis). University of Edinburgh, Scotland. 
  
Luoma, P., & Goodstein, J. (1999). Stakeholders and corporate boards: Institutional 
influences on board composition and structure. Academy of Management Journal, 
42(5), 553-563.  
Marks, J. T., & Ugo, P. A. (2012). A Violation of Trust: Fraud Risk in Nonprofit 
Organizations. Retrieved from 
http://www.nonprofitrisk.org/library/articles/A_Violation_of_Trust_Fraud_Risk_in_N
onprofit_Organizations.shtml. 
McHargue, S. K. (2003). Learning for performance in non-profit organizations. Advances in 
Developing Human Resources, 5(2), 196–204. 
Mellahi, K., & Wilkinson, A. (2004). Organizational Failure: A Critique of Recent Research 
and a Proposed Integrative Framework. International Journal of Management 
Reviews, 5(1), 21–41. 
Mohan, J., & Barnard, S. (2013). Comparisons between the characteristics of charities in 
Scotland and those of England and Wales (Research Report). London: Alliance 
Publishing Trust. 
Packard, T. (2010). Staff perceptions of variables affecting performance in human service 
organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 39(6), 971–990. 
Perkins, D. C., & Fields, D. (2010). Top management team diversity and performance of 
Christian churches. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 39(5), 825–843. 
PKF Littlejohn. (2016). Annual Fraud Indicator 2016 (Research Report). London: Author. 
Rothschild, J. (2013). The Fate of Whistleblowers in Nonprofit Organizations. Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42(5), 886–901. 
  
Sargeant, A., & Lee, S. (2002). Improving Public Trust in the Voluntary Sector: An 
Empirical Analysis. International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Marketing, 7(1), 68–83. 
Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator. (2014). Inquiry Policy. Dundee: Author. 
Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator. (2015). The Kiltwalk (Inquiry Report). Dundee: 
Author. 
Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator. (n.d.). Meeting the Charity Test: Guidance for 
applicants and for existing charities. Dundee: Author. 
Wallgren, A., & Wallgren, B. (2007). Register-based Statistics: Administrative Data for 
Statistical Purposes. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Wollebaek, D. (2009). Survival in Local Voluntary Associations. Nonprofit Management & 
Leadership, 19(3), 267–284. 
Yetman, M. H., & Yetman, R. J. (2012). The effects of governance on the accuracy of 
charitable expenses reported by nonprofit organizations. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 29(3), 738–767.  
  
Biographies 
Diarmuid McDonnell is a Doctoral Researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University 
of Stirling. His mixed methods research explores the determinants of nonprofit misconduct 
and vulnerability, and utilises linked administrative data derived from the Scottish charity 
regulator. 
Dr Alasdair Rutherford is a Senior Lecturer in Social Statistics at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Stirling. His research focus is the analysis of administrative and 
survey data in the fields of health, social care and the third sector. 
  
  
Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Charity misconduct dataset: sample selection process 
  
Sample Selection  
Initial sample 44,888 
   Removal of dummy observations 2 
   Removal of observations with invalid legal 
names (corresponds to organizations never 
recognised by previous regulatory regime) 
1,777 
   Removal of charities never recognised by 
OSCR when it took up its regulatory powers or 
those subsequently removed under its Rolling 
Review programme 
12,371 
   Removal of observations with recorded income 
of £0 
1,952 
   Removal of observations with missing data for 
income 
1,448 
   Removal of observations with missing or 
invalid data for organization age 
1,733 
Final sample 25,611 charities 
Note: the final sample size presented in this table is used for the descriptive analyses; the 
inferential analyses necessitate further reductions in the sample size due to the removal of 
observations which have missing values for any of the independent variables included in the 
statistical models. 
  
Table 2. Actors that trigger regulatory investigations 
Actor N % 
Member of the public 672 48 
Charity member 229 16 
Anonymous 137 10 
Charity employee 110 8 
Trustee 98 7 
Other (e.g. funder, other regulator, auditor) 154 11 
Total 1,400 100 
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. 
  
  
Table A1. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of being investigated 
 Not investigated 
(N=20,644) 
 Investigated 
(N=1,444) 
 Whole sample 
(N=22,088) 
Variable M SD  M SD  M SD 
Age (ln) 2.86 .91  2.72 .87  2.85 .91 
Grant .34 .47  .27 .45  .34 .47 
Parent .17 .38  .07 .26  .16 .37 
£1 - £24,999 (%) 61 -  29 -  59 - 
£10m + (%) 1 -  8 -  2 - 
Company (%) 19 -  46 -  21 - 
Unincorporated association (%) 55 -  32 -  54 - 
Operate locally (%) 46 -  25 -  45 - 
Operate overseas (%) 12 -  14 -  12 - 
Social services (%) 31 -  26 -  31 - 
Culture and recreation (%) 15 -  14 -  15 - 
Note: Figures and percentages rounded to two decimal places and nearest whole number 
respectively. The sample size is smaller compared to that reported in Table 1 as it only 
includes observations for which there are no missing values for any of the independent 
variables. Only selected categories from the nominal variables are included for the purpose of 
brevity. 
  
  
Table A2. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of regulatory action 
 No action 
necessary 
(N=840)  
Action 
(N=328)  
Whole sample 
(N=1,238) 
Variable M SD  M SD  M SD 
Age (ln) 2.75 .88  2.69 .79  2.73 .86 
Grant .27 .43  .25 .43  .27 .44 
Parent .07 .25  .07 .26  .07 .25 
£1 - £24,999 (%) 24 -  31 -  26 - 
£10m + (%) 10 -  5 -  8 - 
Member of Public (%) 51 -  41 -  48 - 
Internal Charity Stakeholder (%) 31 -  36 -  32 - 
Anonymous (%) 11 -  7 -  10 - 
Other e.g. funder, auditor (%) 8 -  17 -  11 - 
Company (%) 49 -  44 -  48 - 
Unincorporated association (%) 29 -  37 -  31 - 
Operate locally (%) 21 -  28 -  23 - 
Operate overseas (%) 13 -  12 -  13 - 
Social services (%) 26 -  25 -  26 - 
Culture and recreation (%) 13 -  15 -  14 - 
Note: Figures and percentages rounded to two decimal places and nearest whole number 
respectively. Only selected categories from the nominal variables are included for the 
purpose of brevity. 
  
  
Table A3. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of regulatory intervention versus advice 
 Advice 
(N=200) 
 Intervention 
(N=128) 
 Whole sample 
(N=328) 
Variable M SD  M SD  M SD 
Age (ln) 2.67 .83  2.72 .73  2.69 .79 
Grant .22 .41  .30 .46  .25 .43 
Parent .09 .28  .05 .21  .07 .26 
£1 - £24,999 (%) 33 -  27 -  31 - 
£10m + (%) 6 -  5 -  5 - 
Member of Public (%) 40 -  41 -  41 - 
Internal Charity Stakeholder (%) 39 -  30 -  36 - 
Anonymous (%) 7 -  7 -  7 - 
Other e.g. funder, auditor (%) 14 -  21 -  17 - 
Company (%) 44 -  44 -  44 - 
Unincorporated association (%) 37 -  37 -  37 - 
Operate locally (%) 27 -  30 -  28 - 
Operate overseas (%) 14 -  10 -  12 - 
Social services (%) 24 -  27 -  25 - 
Culture and recreation (%) 16 -  13 -  15 - 
Note: Figures and percentages rounded to two decimal places and nearest whole number 
respectively. Only selected categories from the nominal variables are included for the 
purpose of brevity. 
  
  
Table 3. Results of Logistic Regression on dependent variables 
  Investigation1  Action2  Intervention3 
  OR SE  OR SE  OR SE 
Size £1 - £24,999 Ref. –  Ref. –  Ref. – 
 £25,000 - £99,999 2.12*** .18  1.22 .24  1.66 .55 
 £100,000 - £499,999 3.12*** .28  .75 .16  1.04 .39 
 £500,000 - £999,999 4.36*** .59  .65 .20  2.98 1.68 
 £1,000,000 - £9,999,999 4.67*** .55  .42** .13  .57 .34 
  £10m + 10.29*** 1.60  .55 .20  1.18 .83 
Age  .95 .03  .95 .08  1.11 .20 
Grant  .77*** .06  .82 .15  1.46 .47 
Parent  .49*** .06  .89 .25  .33 .19 
Complaint Member of Public – –  Ref. –  Ref. – 
 Internal Charity 
Stakeholder 
– –  1.32 .21  .71 .22 
 Anonymous – –  .69 .18  .89 .45 
 Other e.g. funder, auditor – –  2.58*** .56  1.23 .44 
          
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
n  22,088  1,168  319 
  
Log-likelihood  -4738.40  -648.21  -199.23 
LR test (X2)  1192.03***  90.54***  30.43 
McFadden’s adjusted R2 .11  .01  .08 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 .18  .12  .13 
Cragg and Uhler’s R2  .14  .11  .12 
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. Constant is omitted. OR: Odds Ratio. SE: 
Standard Error. Controls: Field, Form and Geography. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
1 Models the probability of an organization being investigated 
2 Given an investigation, models the probability of the regulator taking any form of action 
3 Given regulatory action, models the probability of intervention, as opposed to advice 
  
Figure 1. Association between type of complaint and regulator response 
Note: Each complaint can have two types, and maps to one of the regulatory responses. The 
fifteen most common complaint types are shown. The thickness of the line is proportional to 
the number of complaints leading to each regulatory response. 
  
  
Figure 2. Quasi-Variance log odds of being investigated 
 
